NOTE
RETHINKING CRIMINAL JOINDER: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR JUSTICE
I
INTRODUCTION

This note reconsiders the rules of procedure governing criminal joinder in
light of empirical studies on jury behavior. The discussion is limited to
criminal joinder under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.' The
analysis is relevant to criminaljoinder in state prosecutigns to the extent that
the state rules are patterned after the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The procedural rules that govern federal criminal joinder and severance
are Rules 8 (joinder) and 14 (severance) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Rule 8(a) provides standards for determining when a single
defendant who has allegedly committed multiple criminal offenses may have
the offenses joined in a single trial. Rule 8(b) provides standards for
evaluating when multiple defendants may be joined and tried together in a
single trial. These rules "have achieved no more than rudimentary
development and articulation."-2 Because of the underdevelopment of these
rules and the existence of a body of empirical data to test the assumptions
behind the rules, the time is ripe for a reconsideration of this area of criminal
procedure.
This note considers joinder of offenses (Rule 8(a)) and joinder of
defendants (Rule 8(b)) separately. Each discussion begins with an overview of
the existing legal rules and the policy that underlies them. The next section
deals with an analysis of the existing empirical research. A large amount of
empirical data exists for joinder of offenses, while no empirical research has
Copyright © 1989 by Law and Contemporary Problems
1. The focus here is on criminal, rather than civil, joinder for two reasons. First, to date little
empirical research has been done on juries and civil joinder. Of course, some of the data resulting
from research on criminal joinder may also be applicable in a civil context. Nevertheless, there is a
need for empirical research specifically addressed to the problems ofjoinder for the jury in a civil
trial. For a promising beginning toward that end, see Horowitz & Bordens, The Effects of Outlier
Presence, Plaintiff Population Size, and Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury Decisions, 12 LAw &
HuM. BEHAV. 209 (1988). Second, the issues of fairness and justice, while important in a civil trial,
are not as urgent or compelling as they are when presented in a criminal proceeding. Thus,
arguments forjoinder on the basis ofjudicial economy may be given greater weight in a civil setting,
when the countervailing issues ofjustice and fairness are not as forceful.
2. 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ch. 13, at 13-14 (2d ed. 1980).
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been done directly on joinder of defendants; as a result, the 8(a) section of
this note is more extensive than the 8(b) section.
In analyzing the 8(a) empirical data, I am not attempting to provide an
exhaustive bibliographic survey of the research; the purpose is to discuss the
application of the research to the federal rules governing criminal joinder as
well as to suggest what issues need to be researched further. An example of
the need for further research is that the empirical data show that a defendant
faces a greater likelihood of conviction if he faces a single trial with joined
offenses than if he is tried separately on all offenses, although the studies do
not agree on exactly why this is so.
The next section in each part involves a discussion of the existing rules in
light of this empirically demonstrated prejudice. The administration of the
rules is examined to see whether some curative condition may mitigate this
prejudice. The note concludes that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
dealing with criminal joinder are not applied in such a way as to cure
prejudice to the defendant. Revisions of the Rule are proposed, and a call is
made for a more equitable balancing by judges of the prejudice to defendants
in their rulings on Rule 14 severance motions.
The issues raised by the current treatment of criminal joinder involve a
number of constitutional considerations. A criminal trial may determine an
individual's liberty, or even life, directly raising the issue of due process.3 The
Constitution also guarantees individuals the right to trial by an impartial jury
in all criminal proceedings. 4 Thus, if joinder forces an individual to face a
much greater likelihood of conviction than he would if he had been tried
alone or had his offenses tried separately, joinder may not just be unfair; it
may violate his constitutional rights.
II
JOINDER OF OFFENSES:

A.

RULE 8(A)

The Legal Standards

The great bulk of empirical research on criminal joinder is focused on
joinder of offenses, covered by Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Rule 8 provides the outer limits of what may be joined in a
federal criminal action, 5 allowing for joinder of offenses when the offenses

charged are: (1) of the same or similar character; (2) based on the same act or
transaction; or (3) based on two or more acts or transactions connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. 6 The policies
behind joinder are judicial economy and convenience. 7 The government is
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 906 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'don other grounds, 452
U.S. 576 (1981). The First Circuit observed that joinder beyond Rule 8 is "per se impermissible"
(citing King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700 (lst Cir. 1966)).
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a).
7. See United States v. Swift, 809 F.2d 320, 322 (6th Cir. 1987).
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able to conserve funds, and joinder makes the trial process more convenient
for witnesses and public authorities.8
The defendant himself may find a joined trial beneficial. He may prefer
the convenience of a single trial as opposed to multiple trials, may have his
case disposed of more quickly, or may benefit from concurrent sentencing. 9
Conflicts arise, however, when a defendant believes that these potential
advantages are outweighed by the prejudicial effects of a joined trial, and
therefore seeks severance. It is in the context of disputes between the
government and defendants about joined or severed trials that the issue of
fairness to the defendant arises.
Rule 14 allows a trial judge to sever offenses joined under Rule 8 if the
joinder is prejudicial to the defendant or the government.' 0 The trial judge is
given broad discretion in weighing the possibility of prejudice to a party
against the considerations of judicial economy.'' Furthermore, the concern
with judicial economy is considered dominant to the extent that the
defendant may have to show that the joinder was "manifestly prejudicial."' 12
Federal courts have recognized four sources of prejudice that may harm a
defendant in a joined trial: (1) The jury may become confused by the
evidence across charges and fail to compartmentalize the evidence properly
("jury confusion" theory);' 3 (2) The jury may accumulate the evidence across
charges, giving the evidence greater weight on one charge as a result of
hearing evidence on other charges ("accumulation of evidence" theory); 14 (3)
The jury may infer that the defendant has a criminal disposition and find him
guilty because of this disposition ("criminal inference" theory); 15 (4) The
defendant may become embarrassed or confounded in presenting separate
defenses. 16 Of these four possible sources of prejudice, the first three have
been empirically tested. The results and implications of tests designed to
measure these prejudices are discussed below.
B.

The Empirical Research

1. General Methodological Review. Seven published studies have tested mock
jurors' reactions to a trial where criminal offenses are joined: Kerr and
Sawyers, 17 Bordens, Horowitz, and Feldman,' 8 Bordens and Horowitz,' 9
8. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968).
9. 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, Standard 13-2.1, commentary at 13-13.
10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14.
11. United States v. Butler, 822 F.2d 1191, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
12. United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1980).
13. See United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733, 736 (4th Cir. 1976).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. This argument for severance was presented in Cross v.United States, 335 F.2d 987, 989-90
(D.C. Cir. 1964). It has since been limited to cases where the defendant can show both important
testimony to offer on one count and a strong need to refrain from testifying on another account.
Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 976-78 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
17. Kerr & Sawyers, Independence of MVultiple Verdicts Within a Trial by Mock Jurors, 10
REPRESENTATIVE RES. Soc. PSYClOLOGY 16 (1979).
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Tanford and Penrod (1982),20 Tanford and Penrod (1984),2 1 Tanford,
Penrod, and Collins, 2 2 and Greene and Loftus. 23 Although each study is in
certain ways methodologically distinct, 2 4 the tests follow a general pattern.
First, the researcher uses a control group to pre-test the offenses to
determine the percentage of guilty verdicts for each charge when presented in
isolation. A group of mock jurors is then exposed to the evidence of the
joined offenses. The jurors next vote on whether the defendant is guilty or
not guilty, 2 5 and answer further questions designed to illuminate the process
that led them to their verdict. The jurors typically are asked to recall specific
evidence offered during the trial (bearing on the jury confusion theory), rate
the evidence (bearing on the accumulation of evidence theory), and rate the
defendant for such things as dangerousness, likeability, believability, and
honesty (bearing on the criminal inference theory). 26 These ratings are
compared with those of the control group. In some tests, instructions are
given to the jury to determine the effectiveness of the instructions in a joined
27
trial.
2. Jury Confusion. Bordens and Horowitz found that jury confusion existed
in a joined offense trial and found that the confusion was causally linked to
biased verdicts against the defendants. 28 Greene and Loftus listed three
hypotheses that may account for juror confusion.2 9 Jurors' memories may
become overloaded by a number of facts they find difficult to remember;

jurors may integrate information from different sources; 30 or jurors may
remember only selective, salient information, serving to confirm their
verdict. 3 1 Greene and Loftus, however, found no significant juror confusion
18.

Bordens, Horowitz & Feldman, A Comparison of Verdicts Obtained in Severed and Joined Criminal
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 444 (1980).
Bordens & Horowitz, Information Processing inJoined and Severed Trials, 13 J. APPLIED SOC.

Trials, 10 J.
19.

PSYCHOLOGY

351 (1983).

Tanford & Penrod, Biases in Trials Involving Defendants Charged with Multiple Offenses, 12 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 453 (1982).
21. Tanford & Penrod, Social Inference Processes in JurorJudgments of Multiple-Offense Trials, 47 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 749 (1984).
22. Tanford, Penrod & Collins, Decision Making in Joined Criminal Tials: The Influence of Charge
Similarity, Evidence Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 319 (1985).
23. Greene & Loftus, When Crimes are Joined at Trial, 9 Lw & HUM. BEHAV. 193 (1985).
24. For a summary of some of the important methodological differences, see infra Part II.B.5.
25. The researchers have used two different methods for measuring the guilty or not guilty
choice. See Tanford & Penrod, supra note 20; Tanford & Penrod, supra note 21; Tanford, Penrod &
Collins, supra note 22 (each using a dichotomous guilty or not guilty choice). Compare Bordens,
Horowitz & Feldman, supra note 18; Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 19; Greene & Loftus, supra note
23 (each using a spectrum with a continuous measure of guilt allowing for more degrees of guilt).
26. Two different methods are used by the researchers to measure the amount ofjury confusion.
See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 19 (using a free recall task where jurors were asked to record
what they remembered); Tanford & Penrod, supra note 20. Compare Greene & Loftus, supra note 23
(using a recognition task where jurors were asked by the researchers to answer specific questions
about the evidence); Tanford & Penrod, supra note 21; Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 22.
27. For a discussion of the results of these tests, see infra Part II.C.4.
28. Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 19, at 369.
29. Greene & Loftus, supra note 23, at 193-94.
30. See Bower, Black & Turner, Scripts in Memory for Text, 1 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 177 (1979).
31. See Greene, Whodunit? Memory for Evidence in Text, 94 AM. J.'PSYCHOLOGY 479 (1981).
20.
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in their study of joined criminal offenses. 32 This result, however, may be
attributable to the relative lack of evidence used in their study, or because
they did not require the jurors to use a free recall task. 33
Separate studies by Tanford and Penrod in 198234 and 1984, 3 5 and by
Tanford, Penrod, and Collins in 1985,36 all found some evidence of jury
confusion of facts, but concluded that this confusion did not cause biased
verdicts. Thus, the studies are not in complete agreement about whether
juror confusion is a source of biased guilty verdicts in trials ofjoined criminal
offenses. Most of the studies show that confusion by jurors is not related to
biased guilty verdicts. Only one study found juror confusion to be a
significant factor. 3 7 This finding may be due to a methodological difference:
The recall task may have been set up in a way that was directly related to guilt
determinations. 38 The conclusion that juror confusion is not related to biased
verdicts is supported by research showing that memory of particular facts
does not correlate strongly with general impressions. 3 9 Future research into
the exact nature of juror memory errors, which could resolve the
methodological differences between the studies, would be useful in fully
explaining the differences between the studies on the effect ofjury confusion
on guilty verdicts. 40
3. Incorrect Accumulation (Weight) of the Evidence. Some studies have shown
relatively slight support for this theory of bias. 4' Bordens and Horowitz,
however, found absolutely no evidence to support a theory that jurors allow
32. Greene & Loftus, supra note 23, at 205.
33. Bordens & Horowitz, Joinder of Criminal Offenses: A Review of the Legal and Psychological
Literature, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 339, 345 (1985). Greene and Loftus admitted this possibility.
Greene & Loftus, supra note 23, at 205, 207.
34. Tanford & Penrod, supra note 20, at 476.
35. Tanford & Penrod, supra note 21, at 762.
36. Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 22, at 334.
37. See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 19, at 369.
38. Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 22, at 323. Or, alternatively, the other studies may
have underestimated the role confusion of evidence plays by failing to use a free recall task and by
using a dichotomous and not continuous measure of guilt. For an argument to that effect, see
Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 33, at 344-46.
39. See Anderson & Hubert, Effects of Concomitant Verbal Recall on Order Effects in Personality
Impression Formation, 2J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 379 (1963); Dreben, Fiske & Hastie, The
Independence of Evaluative and Item Information: Behavior-based Impression Formation, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1758 (1979); Riskey, Verbal Vemory Processes in Impression Formation, 5 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 271 (1979).
40. Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 33, at 344-47.
41. See Tanford & Penrod, supra note 20, at 476-77; Tanford & Penrod, supra note 21, at 762;
Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 22, at 334. In these studies, jurors were asked to rate on a
numerical scale the prosecution's and the defendant's evidence. The ratings of the prosecution
evidence were higher in joined than in severed cases, while the ratings of the defense evidence were
lower in joined than in severed cases. For a further empirical study in a non-criminal joinder context
supporting the notion that jurors' perception of the evidence is affected, see Saunders, Vidmar &

Hewitt, Eyewitness Testimony and the Discrediting Effect, in

EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE

Lloyd-Bostock & B. Clifford eds. 1983) (study of eyewitness testimony).

57, 74 (S.

330
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evidence of one charge to enforce the incriminating value of a second
charge.

42

These differences may be attributable to the methodological differences
among the studies. 4 3 Reconciling the studies is not a crucial issue, though, as
no researcher maintains that accumulation of evidence is an important factor
in producing biased verdicts.
4. Jury Inference of Defendant's Criminality. Studies have found relatively
strong support for this theory of biased verdicts. 4 4 The inference made by the
jury that the defendant has a criminal personality type is consistent with the
findings of Bordens and Horowitz. 4 5 This theory is consistent with social
science research concerning the "halo effect" (people infer that a person with
one negative trait has other negative traits as well). 46 Tanford and Penrod
went so far as to propose a "path model" outlining the process by which
criminal inferences made about the defendant influenced later jury judgments
about the evidence.

47

There are, however, limitations to the use of a path analysis based on a
retrospective application of guilty verdicts. 48 Future research is needed to
determine whether a causal link exists between a guilty verdict and a criminal
inference by the jury. 49 Although it is clear that the two correlate, it is still
possible that the criminal inference is made after the jury reaches its guilty
verdict.

50

5. General Joinder Effect Unanimously Found. Although the studies reach
somewhat different conclusions about the particular causes of biases to
defendants in trials of joined offenses (as shown above), the studies are
unanimous in finding that defendants do face a greater likelihood of
conviction if offenses are tried jointly rather than separately. 5' Furthermore,
42. Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 19, at 369. Bordens and Horowitz asked jurors to write
down their "thoughts" about the cases they heard and to rate the degree to which these thoughts
favored the prosecution or the defense. There was no significant difference in ratings of antidefendant thoughts in joined versus severed cases.
43. Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 33, at 347-48.
44. See, e.g., Greene & Loftus, supra note 23, at 204-05; Tanford & Penrod, supra note 20, at 477;
Tanford & Penrod, supra note 21, at 762-63; Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 22, at 334.
45. Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 19, at 368.
46. Rosenberg & Sedlak, Structural Representations of Implicit Personality Theory, in 6 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 235, 238 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1972).

47. Tanford & Penrod, supra note 21, at 760, 763.
48. See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 33, at 348-49.
49. Constructing an experiment to test for this causal connection would not be a difficult task.
One could devise a study in which ratings of the defendant are taken at various points throughout a
joined trial, for example. Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 33, at 349.
50.

Greene & Loftus, supra note 23, at 204-05.

51.

See, e.g., Bordens, Horowitz & Feldman, supra note 18, at 453-54; Bordens & Horowitz, supra

note 19, at 366-68; Greene & Loftus, supra note 23, at 204-05; Tanford & Penrod, supra note 20, at
475; Tanford & Penrod, supra note 21, at 761; Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 22, at 332. Kerr
& Sawyers, supra note 17, found evidence of a joinder effect, but did not provide a basis for

comparing the result of the joined trial with the result if the defendant had been tried for each
offense separately.
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the effect of joinder increases with the number of offenses charged. 52 A
cumulative compilation of all the joinder research findings shows that the
effect of joinder of offenses is robust; 5 3 there is a significantly greater
likelihood of conviction for defendants.
These findings have been constant despite varying methodologies by the
researchers. The defendant faced a greater likelihood of conviction under
joinder of offenses whether the researchers used written summaries, 54 audio
tapes, 55 or videotapes; 56 whether there were two, three, or four offenses
charged; 5 7 whether the jurors actually deliberated; 58 whether the jurors were
undergraduate students or regular jurors previously summoned for jury
60
duty; 59 and whether the researcher was able to use a full factorial design.

6.

ParticularInstances of the Joinder Effect.

a. The effect of the order of offenses. Two studies have found that trials of
joined offenses prejudice defendants by leading to a greater likelihood of
conviction, but only on the first offense before the jury. 6 ' Other studies,
however, have consistently found no increased proportion of convictions on
the first charge as opposed to later charges. 6 2 Tanford, Penrod, and Collins
actually found a greater proportion of convictions on the later offenses
63
charged.
There is no consistent evidence of the effect ofjoinder being influenced by
the order in which offenses are presented. The different findings by the
researchers may result from the use of different case studies and the varying
64
strengths of the cases employed by the researchers.
b.

Weaker cases.

66
Kerr and Sawyers 6 5 and Tanford, Penrod, and Collins

found that thejoinder effect was greater when cases are weak. Among a series
ofjoined offenses, a control group was least likely to convict a defendant in a
separate trial of the offense that had the greatest proportionate variance from
the control group verdict when tried with other crimes.
52.
53.
54.
55.
354.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Tanford & Penrod, supra note 20, at 475.
Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 22, at 332-33.
Greene & Loftus, supra note 23, at 194-95; Kerr & Sawyers, supra note 17, at 18.
Bordens, Horowitz & Feldman, supra note 18, at 449; Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 19, at
Tanford & Penrod,
Tanford & Penrod,
Tanford & Penrod,
Id. at 752-53.
Tanford, Penrod &

supra note 21, at 754-55.
supra note 20, at 458-59.
supra note 21, at 755.

Collins, supra note 22, at 324. For a discussion of factorial designs and
CARLSMITH, P. ELLSWORTH & E. ARONSON, METHODS OF
RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 243-55 (1976).
61. Bordens, Horowitz & Feldman, supra note 18, at 453; Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 19, at
366.
62. See Greene & Loftus, supra note 23; Kerr & Sawyers, supra note 17; Tanford & Penrod, supra
note 20.
63. Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 22, at 333.
64. Id.
65. Kerr & Sawyers, supra note 17.
66. Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 22, at 333.

their usefulness in empirical research, seeJ.
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c. Similar offenses. Separate studies have found that the effect of joinder
is stronger when the cases joined were similar as opposed to dissimilar. 67 In
other words, there was a greater variance from control group severed verdicts
when two rape charges against a defendant were tried together (joinder
under the similar offense provision of Rule 8(a)), than when a rape and a
murder charge were joined against a defendant (joined because they arose
under the same plan).
7. Summary. The empirical data unequivocally show that the probability of
a defendant being convicted significantly increases if offenses are joined
rather than tried separately. The data are not presently conclusive as to the
exact cause of thejoinder effect. It appears to be based on an inference by the
jury that the defendant is a criminal, but this has not yet been proved to be a
causal link. A less likely possibility that cannot be conclusively rejected yet is
that jurors' memories become confused in joined trials, and that, as a result,
jurors do not properly segregate the information they are given.
It is crucial to determine exactly what causes jurors to reach a greater
proportion of guilty verdicts in trials of joined offenses. If the joinder effect
occurs because jurors' cognitive processes are overwhelmed, the problem may
be solved through some form of case management, such as multiple juries,
juror instructions, 6 and juror education, which would aid the jury in
segregating the facts. 6 9 If, however, the effect is based on an inference of
criminality made by the jury, the problem is unlikely to be solved through case
management. The only solution might well be a less frequent and more
circumspect use of joinder.
C.

The Implications of the Empirical Research on the Law of Joinder of
Offenses

1. Rule 8(a). The provision of Rule 8(a) allowing for the joinder of similar
but unrelated offenses should be modified. Similar-offense joinder is the
most controversial of the 8(a) joinder provisions; it is not allowed in the great
majority of states. 70 The argument for judicial economy is particularly
unpersuasive for similar-offense joinder. Since the offenses are distinct, the
joined trial will often require separate evidence and witnesses. 7 ' The only
time savings would be realized in empanelling the jury and presenting
background evidence about the defendant. 72 These minor time savings seem
67. See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 19, at 366; Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 22, at
333.
68. See infra Part II.C.4. For discussion of an empirical study showing that clearer jury
instructions may reduce the number of guilty verdicts, see Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of
Jurors to Comprehend and Apply CriminalJury Instructions, 17 LAw & Soc'v REV. 153, 194-96 (1982).
69.

Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 33, at 350-51.

70. Note, Joint and Single Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal.Rules of Criminal Procedure, 74
YALE L.J. 553, 560 (1965).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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to be greatly outweighed by the prejudice against the defendant shown to
exist by the empirical data in joined trials. The prejudice may be particularly
great since the offenses are similar. 7 3 Furthermore, the legislative history of
similar-offense joinder undermines the rationale ofjudicial economy. Similaroffense joinder was not enacted to save time; it was a by-product of the
74
regulation of marshal's fees.
Similar-offense joinder is particularly pernicious because it invites an end
run around Federal Rule of Evidence 404 (evidence of other crimes is
prohibited if it is offered to prove criminal disposition). 75 After hearing
evidence of other crimes, a jury may make the impermissible inference that a
defendant is a criminal on the basis of the multiple crimes before it, and
convict on that basis. The empirical data strongly support the proposition
that juries do this. 76 Courts, too, have recognized this danger. 77 Thejudicial
response in most cases, however, has often been to allow thejoinder and rely
upon a jury instruction to eliminate any prejudice. 78 The inadequacy of jury
instructions to effect this result is dealt with below.
Rule 8(a) should be revised to protect defendants against the prejudices
involved in similar-offensejoinder. Perhaps similar-offense joinder should be
abolished altogether, as it has been in many states, in light of its minimal time
savings and proven prejudice. Alternatively, recognizing that a defendant
may prefer a joined trial, the rules could allow the unlimited joinder of
unrelated offenses if a defendant were granted an absolute right to severance,
as the ABA Task Force on Joinder and Severance has proposed. 79 Finally, the
minimum acceptable revision would be to allow for similar-offense joinder
only when the government can clearly show that the evidence introduced
would be admissible anyway at separate trials under an exception to Rule
8
404(b). 0

2. Rule 8(a)Appeals-Misjoinder. The issue whether a trial judge improperly
joined offenses under Rule 8(a) is a question of law, reviewable de novo on
appeal. 8 1 An appellate court, however, may find that even when joinder is
improper, it falls under the harmless error rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of
8 2 The empirical data 8 3
Criminal Procedure, and does not require reversal.
73.
74.
76.

See
See
See
See

77.

See, e.g., United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733, 736-37 (4th Cir. 1976); Drew v. United States,

75.

supra Part II.B.6(c).
Note, supra note 70, at 560 n.37 and legislative history discussed therein.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
supra Part II.B.4.

331 F.2d 85, 89-90 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
78. See discussion in Drew, 331 F.2d at 91.
79. 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, Standard 13-3.1 (a).
80. See Note,Joinder of Criminal Offenses in Nebraska: JudicialDiscretion v. Fair and Impartial Trial, 56
NEB. L. REV. 399, 406 (1977). The court in Foutz, 540 F.2d at 736-38, relied on such a test in finding
prejudicial joinder and reversing a conviction.

81. See United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002, 1006 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005
(1988).
82. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986); see also United States v. Lueth, 807 F.2d
719, 730 n.6 (8th Cir. 1986) (harmless error where judge gave cautionary instructions to the jury).
83. See supra Part II.B.
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should cause appellate courts to be much more cautious in declaring
misjoinder "harmless."
3. Rule 14 Motions for Severance. Although Rule 14 allows a party to obtain
relief from prejudicial joinder, a defendant faces numerous difficulties in
obtaining severance. Procedurally, there is never a good time to claim unfair
joinder. Before trial, such a claim may seem speculative, during the trial,
disruptive, and after the trial, harmless error.8 4 The trial judge is allowed
broad discretion in weighing the possibility of prejudice against the
consideration of efficiency. 8 5 This discretion frequently means that a trial
judge will fail to articulate satisfactorily the reasons for his decision on joinder
and severance.8 6
The standards for overturning a trial judge's Rule 14 refusal to sever are
imposing. A defendant must show that the trial court's refusal to sever was an
abuse of discretion.8 7 A defendant must show specifically how he would be
prejudiced;88 he cannot merely assert prejudice in the abstract. 89 The
prejudice must be so compelling that it rises to the level of depriving him of
his right to a fair trial. 90 The mere allegation that he would stand a better
chance of acquittal if granted severance is insufficient to meet these
burdens. 91
In the case of appeals after a joined trial, appellate courts are particularly
reluctant to engage in speculation regarding a jury's motivation during
deliberations. 92 Frequently, courts seem content with a cliched application of
the harmless error rule: "A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a
9
perfect one."

3

The overwhelming empirical data demonstrating the possibility of
prejudice to defendants in trials of joined offenses 94 should cause courts to
ease the burden of defendants seeking severance.
84.

Dawson,Joint Trials of Defendants in Criminal Cases: An Analysis of Efficiencies and Prejudices, 77

MICH. L. REV. 1379, 1410 (1979).

85.

See United States v. Butler, 822 F.2d 1191, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, Standard 13-5.1, commentary at 13-46.
The need for a meaningful basis of review and guidance for trial courts on the basis of decisions
made in previous cases led the ABA Task Force to propose that courts be required to make a record
of their reasons for granting or denying severance motions. Id.
87. See United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931
(1981).
88. United States v. Mitchell, 788 F.2d 1232, 1237 (7th Cir. 1986).
89. United States v. Markey, 693 F.2d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 1982).
90. United States v. Burton, 724 F.2d 1283, 1287 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Arbelaez, 719
F.2d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984). The same standards apply when a
defendant seeks habeas corpus relief for a state's improper refusal to sever. See, e.g., Panzavecchia v.
Wainwright, 658 F.2d 337, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1981).
91. United States v. Butler, 792 F.2d 1528, 1534 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 933 (1986)
(Butler dealt with joined defendants, not joined offenses, however.).
92. See Dawson, supra note 84, at 1402.
93. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
94. See supra Part II.B.5.

86.
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4. The Current Judicial Approach of Curative Conditions. The legal system,
without reference to empirical data, recognizes the dangers of prejudice when
offenses are joined. In response, courts have relied upon several curative
conditions, which, if they exist, may justify a refusal to sever under Rule 14.
These conditions include: (1) limiting instructions to thejury; 9 5 (2) the ability
of the jury to compartmentalize the evidence 9 6 (sometimes shown through an
acquittal on any count); 9 7 (3) the presence of overwhelming guilt in the
record; 98 and (4) the use of concurrent sentencing. 9 9 The law today assumes
that these conditions may be adequate to rectify any prejudices defendants
suffer because ofjoinder. 0 0 These conditions need to be rethought in light
of the empirical data.
The conditions of overwhelming guilt in the record and concurrent
sentencing are controversial at best. Applying a test of overwhelming guilt is
not responsive to Rule 14, provides no discretionary guidance, and invites
abuse in the form of a solely pro forma review by the appellate court.' 0 '
Concurrent sentencing may be of little consolation to a defendant who,
without joinder, may have been acquitted of all offenses or received lesser or
suspended sentences on each count.' 0 2 The effectiveness of these curative
conditions is especially dubious in light of the significant evidence on the
prejudicial effects ofjoinder.
Limiting instructions are a pervasive means by which the law seeks to
control the potentially prejudicial damage that occurs during the course of a
trial. The Supreme Court itself has recognized, however, that there are
limitations to the value of jury instructions.' 0 3 These limitations need to be
re-evaluated in light of the empirical data on both limiting instructions and
criminal joinder.
General empirical research on jury instructions casts doubt upon their
effectiveness in curing a jury's prejudice. Lind concluded that while some
95. United States v. Burgess, 791 F.2d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 1986); Breeland v. Blackburn, 786 F.2d
1239, 1241-42 (5th Cir. 1986).
96. United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d i1i1, 1117-18 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Drew v. United States,
331 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
97. United States v. Thiron, 813 F.2d 146, 155 (8th Cir. 1987); States v. Buishas, 791 F.2d 1310,
1314-15 (7th Cir. 1986).
98. Oliver v. Dugger, 785 F.2d 949, 951-52 (11 th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 859 (1986); Burgess,
791 F.2d at 679.
99. Patterson v. United States, 324 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1963).
100. The Fifth Circuit reflected this attitude:
We concede that joint trials, and especially those involving many defendants, carry
substantial risks of manifest unfairness. At the same time, it is beyond question that such
trials are now an accepted and even necessary aspect of our judicial system. This is because
our system will tolerate the risk of unfairness so long as careful efforts are made to ensure
that the inequities are kept in check.
United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1977).
101. Note, supra note 70, at 555-56.
102. Id. at 555.
103. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968), the Court stated: "There are some
contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the
consequence of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury
system cannot be ignored."
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instructions were followed by a jury, many were ignored. 0 4 Kassin and
Wrightsman found that the effect of instructions varied with the point in the
trial at which they were given.' 0 5 One study found that only one out of
06
eighteen jurors remembered the instructions well enough to follow them.'
Finally, there is evidence that jurors have difficulty understanding the
instructions,10 7 making them difficult to apply, even if jurors remember the
instructions and try to apply them in spite of the prejudicial information they
have heard.
Some of the empirical studies on criminal joinder also tested the effects of
limiting instructions in joined trials. Greene and Loftus found jury
instructions to have no curative effect on the jury.'0 8 Tanford and Penrod
also found them to 1lave no influence in a mock trial of joined offenses.1 0 9
Tanford, Penrod, and Collins did find jury instructions to be effective when
the researchers made a major effort to use non-standard instructions. I ' °
Thus, curative instructions, as used by the courts today, are insufficient to
counter the demonstrated prejudical effects ofjoinder. The confidence that
judges frequently invest in this curative condition when allowing joinder is
rendered dubious by the empirical data. Although one study provides hope
that in certain contexts limiting instructions can be effective to counter the
prejudicial effects ofjoinder, it is an inadequate basis for justifying the current
system, with its demonstrated unfairness to defendants. If courts can devise
new instructions that empirically prove to be effective, a liberal attitude
toward joinder of offenses might be justified. Until then, however, courts
should not take comfort in the fact that a defendant with joined offenses
received curative jury instructions.
A judicial determination that the jury was able to compartmentalize the
evidence is also of questionable curative value in light of the empirical data.
The fact that a defendant is acquitted on one charge should not be conclusive;
without joinder, the defendant might have been acquitted on all counts."'
If indeed the cognitive process is not related to verdicts in joined trials, as
the data suggest,112 then a judicial finding of compartmentalization is
104.

Lind, The Psychology of Courtroom Procedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 13 (N.

Kerr & R. Bray eds. 1982).
105. Kassin & Wrightsman, On the Requirements of Proof: The Timing ofJudicial Instructions and Mock
Juror Verdicts, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1877 (1979).

106. Hoffman & Brodley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. REv. 235, 245 (1952).
107. See, e.g., A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE
(1982). This study found an average of about 50% comprehension, but the exact percentage varies.
108. Greene & Loftus, supra note 23, at 205-06. Greene and Loftus used actual Washington State
multiple offense instructions, and found them ineffective regardless of when they were used in the
trial (contra Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 105).
109. Tanford & Penrod, supra note 21, at 761.
110. Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 22, at 335. This result is somewhat limited by the use
of elaborate instructions, the use of undergraduates instead of representative jurors, and the fact that
the instructions, while they influenced verdicts, failed to influence the memory, evidence, strength,
and perception of the evidence reported by the jurors. Id. at 334.
1ll. Note, supra note 70, at 555.
112. See supra Part II.B.2.
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irrelevant. If further research were to show that the cognitive process of
jurors does cause biased verdicts in trials of joined offenses,
compartmentalization would be relevant. The inquiry would then shift to
finding solutions, such as empanelling multiple juries, allowing note-taking,
or improving limiting instructions," 3 which could be shown empirically to aid
juror cognition and produce unbiased verdicts.
III
JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS:

A.

RULE 8(B)

The Legal Standards

The outer limits of thejoinder of criminal defendants is set by Rule 8(b) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 8(b) allows thejoinder of two
or more defendants "if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions" that constitute a
criminal offense." t 4 If the joinder is based on the broader provision of being
part of a series of acts or transactions, there must at least be a logical
relationship between the offenses charged.' 1 5 The standard for joining
defendants is even broader under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"). 116 Under RICO, unrelated crimes or
conspiracies may be joined if they are shown to have furthered the affairs of
117
an enterprise (defined in RICO).
The policy behind allowing joinder of defendants is principally an
efficiency concern,'8 although a fairness rationale of consistency of result,
and a concern for giving the jury an "overall" view, are sometimes articulated
as well.' 19
Rule 14, which by implication limits severance to cases where compelling
prejudice is demonstrated, applies to joinder of defendants as well as to
joinder of offenses.' 20 Courts have recognized a number of circumstances
where compelling prejudice exists as a matter of law.' 2' These examples are
113. See Calo,joint Trials, Spillover Prejudice, and the Ineffectiveness of a Bare Limiting Instruction, 9 AM.
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 21, 37-41 (1985).
114. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b).
115. See United States v. Fischl, 797 F.2d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 1986) (court held that defendant
Fischl's participation in a kickback scheme and cover-up was "inextricably intertwined" with his
codefendant's offenses).
116. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
117. See United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1510 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1021 (1987); United States v. Manzella, 782 F.2d 533, 540 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123
(1986).
118. See Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1004
(1969). For a critical analysis of this efficiency justification, arguing that the supposed efficiencies of
trials of joined defendants are grossly exaggerated or nonexistent, see Dawson, supra note 84, at
1381-91.
119. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 143 (1968) (White, J., dissenting). For a critical
discussion of the nonefficiency justifications ofjoined trials, see Dawson, supra note 84, at 1391-97.
120. See supra Part II.C.3.
121. These instances are: (1) mutually exclusive or antagonistic defenses among defendants, see,
e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 804 F.2d 691, 695 (11 th Cir. 1986); but see United States v. Carrion,
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limited, however. Courts often refuse to find bias against joined defendants
to be compelling. 22 The courts also often rely on the existence of the same
23
curative conditions that are used in an 8(a) analysis.'
B.

The Empirical Research

No empirical research has been published to date dealing with the
potential for prejudice in trials of joined criminal defendants. Given the
importance of Rule 8(b) and the frequency with which it is used to try multiple
defendants, this issue should be a priority for future empirical studies.
Nevertheless some of the data from the 8(a) research are applicable to
trials of joined defendants. The data on the effect (or lack of effect) of
cautionary jury instructions, 124 the evidence about the jury's formation of a
criminal inference, 12 5 and the data on juror confusion 126 (if proven to be
relevant by future research) will all be important in empirically analyzing
potential prejudices in trials of joined defendants. In addition, the fact that
the joinder effect appears stronger in weak cases12 7 may mean that minor
figures in a joint trial suffer particular prejudice.
There is some social psychology research that may have bearing on the
fairness of trials of more than one defendant. Wilder found a strong tendency
for people to attribute similarity to all group members when people are
presented as a group.1 28 There is also a tendency for people to attribute
group characteristics in the direction of the most extreme example presented
809 F.2d 1120, 1125 (5th Cir. 1987) (denial of severance upheld because defenses interpreted as not
mutually exclusive); (2) a codefendant's refusal to offer exculpatory testimony in a joint trial because
of fear of self-incrimination, see United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1084 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 896 (1987) (severance denied unless defendant can make certain showings); and (3) a
codefendant's having made out of court statements that would incriminate the defendant but leave
the defendant without the chance to cross-examine the codefendant, see Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126.
122. Courts have refused to find compelling prejudice in the following situations: (1) when only a
small percentage of evidence is directed against one defendant and he may be hurt by "spillover
prejudice" from evidence against co-defendants, see United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 449 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 928 (1987); United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 737-38 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); (2) when evidence of a codefendant's prior acts or prior criminal record
is introduced, see United States v. Davis, 787 F.2d 1501, 1504 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852
(1986); and (3) when joint defendants elect different (but not mutually exclusive or antagonistic) trial
strategies, see Calo, supra note 113, at 30-31.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986) (presence of overwhelming evidence of
guilt in the record); United States v. Molinares Charris, 822 F.2d 1213, 1221 (1st Cir. 1987)
(adequate limiting instructions given); United States v. Hughes, 817 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 858 (1987) (jury able to compartmentalize); United States v. Moreno Morales, 815
F.2d 725, 742 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 966 (1987) (acquittal on 8 of 48 counts sufficient
evidence of compartmentalization).
124. See supra Part II.C.4.
125. See supra Part II.1.4.
126. See supra Part II.B.2.
127. See supra Part II.B.6(b).
128. Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a Group. Effects on Attributions of Causality and Beliefs, 41 Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 13, 21 (1978).
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to them.' 29 This tendency was found to exist among jurors in a civil trial who
30
were presented with aggregated plaintiffs.'
These data, and the 8(a) research, suggest that jurors are biased against
joined defendants in a trial under Rule 8(b), and that the existing curative
conditions are insufficient to cure the prejudice. This, however, is no more
than a prediction in the absence of specific experiments designed to test for
the potential prejudicial effects of Rule 8(b) joinder. If the data show, as
expected, that significant prejudices exist for joined defendants, courts should
lower the standards they require of defendants to show compelling prejudice
under 8(b), just as they should do under 8(a) for joinder of offenses.
IV
CONCLUSION

Although further research is needed to pinpoint the exact cause of bias
against defendants with offenses joined under Rule 8(a), and although this
further research may have a profound impact in determining how to eliminate
the problem caused by joinder of offenses (less frequent use of joinder or
steps to aid the cognitive process of jurors), this is no excuse for present
idleness. Research has clearly shown that defendants face a significantly
greater probability of conviction if offenses charged against them are tried
jointly instead of separately. Both trial and appellate courts should be more
willing to grant severance in light of strong research findings of prejudice
against the 8(a) defendant.
There are not enough empirical data available at the moment to justify
recommending widespread changes in joinder under Rule 8(b). The data
indirectly applicable to Rule 8(b), however, indicate that courts should be
more cautious about joining defendants and more reluctant to dismiss their
severance motions.
In light of the Constitution's guarantee to a defendant of due process and
an impartial trial, Rule 8(a) should be rewritten by legislators and
administered differently by judges to abolish or at least modify similar-offense
joinder, and to balance a greater concern for fairness to the defendant with a
3
less heavy-handed emphasis on expense, efficiency, and convenience.' '
James Famn
129.

See Leon, Oden & Anderson, Functional ieasurenentsof Social Values, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.

PSYCHOLOGY 301, 307 (1973).

130. See Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 1.
131. The ABA Task Force on Joinder and Severance, using Model Penal Code section
5.03(4)(b)(iii) language, drafted a standard for severance of offenses which improves on Rule 8(a) by
expressing a priority towards fairness that would help guide courts in exercising their discretion in
severance motions.
Standard 13-3.1 Severance of Offenses.
(b) The court, on the application of either the prosecuting attorney or the defendant,
should grant a severance of related offenses:
(i) before trial, whenever severance is deemed appropriate to promote a fair
determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense; or

340
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(ii) during trial, whenever, upon the consent of the defendant or upon a finding or
manifest necessity, severance is deemed necessary to achieve a fair determination of the
defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense.
2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 2.

